Against Self-ownership

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Description

Judul: Against Self-ownership

Penulis: QUSTHAN FIRDAUS (Alumni MA on Ethics University of Melbourne)

Tebal: 66 halaman

Harga: Rp. 40.000,-

Sinopsis:

Ownership means the rights, the states, or the acts of possessing something. In other words, ownership does not only lingually deal with a bundle of rights over things, but also about a state where one possesses things or one’s acts with his things. Therefore, one might conceive that ownership means a collection of rights, states, or acts over properties. It does not necessarily imply that one should hold those three categories altogether in order to show that he genuinely owns something: any one of those three is sufficient for indicating ownership. Some rights which occur from ownership are the rights to control and access properties, (2) to exclude others from accessing properties, and to dispose of properties. Consequently, one might say that it is the rights which specifically underlie the states and the acts of possessing properties.

Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (ASU) is generally perceived as dealing with libertarianism, but its fundamental idea is located in the idea of selfownership (SO) (Cohen, 1995: 67). Cohen conceives of SO as two sides of one coin. On the one hand, he conceives that SO as a concept is coherent whilst, on the other hand, he thinks that SO as a thesis is partially wrong or, at least, it could be falsified. Yet he notes most people respond to SO merely by criticising it without giving much attention to such a distinction. In light of this claim, this mini-thesis will discuss two questions: firstly, to what extent is Cohen’s distinction of the concept and the thesis plausible? Secondly, assuming that Cohen’s distinction is plausible, this mini-thesis will explore whether the concept and the thesis themselves are defensible or not. Following discussion of these points, we ought to be able to draw some conclusions concerning the degree of SO’s plausibility. Analogously, one might ask is it not plausible for someone (either a believer or a non-believer) to conceive of God, as a concept is coherent while believing God, as the thesis, is wrong? The answer obviously depends on what the concept and the thesis are.

 

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