In order to answer that similar question, this mini-thesis will discuss Cohen’s description and defence of the concept and some objections to it in Chapter 1. This chapter will try to show that the concept fails to recognise that the more appropriate relation between persons and themselves is simply attachment and that the notion of owning self is less fundamental compared to the notion of controlling self. Chapter 2 will explore Cohen’s rejection of the thesis, which is based on his advocacy of noncontractual obligations and his proposal to attach joint ownership of external resources to SO. Furthermore, this chapter attempts to show that the more appropriate rejection to the thesis is that ‘owning self’ is not a matter of moral right, rather than establishing non-contractual obligations. Moreover, the thesis itself is trapped in circularity and conjoining it with joint world ownership is conceptually infeasible. Finally, chapter
3 will conclude that Cohen’s distinction of SO as the concept and the thesis is arguably plausible but its plausibility depends on what the concept and the thesis are.